This article focuses on the EU Takeover Directive and its transposition into French law. French outcomes diverge from EC aspirations for greater clarity and uniformity.
capitalism (Kelly, Kelly & Gamble 1997) . CME and LME varieties of capitalism thus 'provide a broader institutional context within which stakeholder and shareholder models of governance can be analyzed' (Vitols 2001: 338) .
Within the LME ideal-type, Hall and Soskice emphasise 'competitive market arrangements' to co-ordinate firm activities, and more specifically 'highly competitive markets' to 'organise relations' with firms' 'suppliers of finance' (Hall & Soskice 2001: 8-9 ). This is market-based firm financing, reliant on capital markets rather than bank-or institutionally-based processes. In CMEs, by contrast, 'non-market' interactions, institutions, relationships and 'modes of co-ordination' are crucial. Firms rely on these non-market oriented networks to 'co-ordinate their endeavours'. Longtermist relations with banks and other private, public or para-public financing institutions are characteristic CME modes of firm financing. These lead to 'network monitoring based on the exchange of private information inside networks' (Hall & Soskice 2001: 8) . The cross-shareholdings which formerly sustained the 'protected capitalism' logic (Schmidt 1996 ) of France's 'financial network economy' (Morin 2000) are typical CME mechanisms.
These two different approaches to the firm financing/corporate governance nexus have different implications for the likelihood, prevalence, and impact of corporate takeovers. This is why the apparently technical issue of takeover regulation is of great political economic significance because, at root, different approaches to takeovers reflect different models of political economy. Takeover regulation is a battleground in the clash of capitalisms within European corporate governance. Broadly speaking, to the extent that market mechanisms can operate un-impeded, the LME approach 6 prevails. To the extent that states and firms are able to introduce or rely on impediments to a free market for corporate control, a more co-ordinated, regulated, or 'institutional economy' (Crouch & Streeck 1997 ) approach prevails.
The potential for takeover, in particular hostile takeover, brings market discipline to bear on the behaviour and operations of management (Manne 1965) . Below par performance can be punished in the capital markets by takeover bids, rewarding shareholders with higher share prices, and sanctioning poor management (often the first to go in subsequent restructuring). Thus a freer functioning market for corporate control in theory results in increased emphasis on 'shareholder value', the core organising principle of 'Anglo-Saxon' LME capitalism (Sternberg 1998: 34-5) . In the UK case, the liberal City Code means the threat of hostile takeover has an important impact on firm and executive behaviour.
Thus much hinges on the presence (or not) of impediments to the free play of takeover market forces. There are two broad (not necessarily mutually exclusive) categories of impediments to takeovers, 'pre-bid' and 'post-bid'. One set of pre-bid takeover defences are clauses in the internal constitutions of companies which insulate management. These include differential shareholder voting rights such as 'golden shares', multiple votes, voting ceilings, and limitations on certain investors' voting rights. Perhaps the most notorious takeover defence is the 'poison pill', which involves 'rights or warrants issued to shareholders that are worthless unless triggered by a hostile acquisition attempt. If triggered, pills give shareholders the ability to purchase shares from, or sell shares back to, the target company' (Monks & Minow 2004: 236) . This raises (perhaps exorbitantly) the cost of a bid, and can derail hostile 7 takeovers. These mechanisms empower 'insiders' at the expense of 'outsiders', and insulate incumbent management. It is to counter such insider protection that the liberal principle of 'one share, one vote, one dividend' is espoused within AngloSaxon influenced calls for 'good' corporate governance (OECD 1999; as a battering ram to allow takeover market forces to penetrate these protective defences.
More generally, patterns of concentrated (as opposed to dispersed) ownership hinder takeovers, so share buy-backs can operate as anti-takeover devices as firms seek to put more of their shares in their own hands.
Post-bid takeover defences involve measures that target boards can take to derail a bid once launched. The range of 'frustrating actions' include divestitures (selling off or 'locking up' prized assets to make the target less attractive), share buy-backs, the search for friendly 'white knights' to buy up significant stakes, and the issuing new shares (with unequal voting rights) to friendly shareholders. The liberal principle of 'board passivity' seeks to outlaw such attempts to undermine the free market for bids.
In similar vein, 'mandatory bid' rules clarify takeover processes by requiring a bid for the whole company to be launched once a controlling right is acquired. This prevents 'creeping control' and protects minority shareholders. These different approaches to takeover regulation rest upon shareholder (LME) and stakeholder (CME) models of capitalism.
Thus the 'clash of capitalisms' explains the political economic causes of divergences between the EC and some member states over specific takeover regulation proposals.
Facilitating hostile takeovers at the EU-level, if successful, would augur transformation of the nexus of European corporate governance institutions, towards 8 LME shareholder value norms. Hoepner and Schafer have recently argued that European integration has entered a new phase in which it 'systematically clashes with national varieties of capitalism' but also 'asymmetrically targets' the institutions of CME stakeholder capitalism, with the result that 'political resistance in the organised economies leads to a crisis of political integration ' (2007: 6) . The findings here offer some support to Hoepner and Schafer's thesis. The politics of EU takeover reform involved a 'clash of capitalisms' logic (Callaghan and Hoepner 2005) of defence of particular national approaches to corporate governance and takeovers from the perceived threat of LME-oriented re-regulation on the part of state actors in more CME-oriented economies (for example, France, Germany & Sweden). This illustrates how European initiatives present opportunities to policy actors in their import and mediation by institutions, governments, and national politics.
However, whilst we agree with Hoepner and Schafer that the 'clash of capitalisms' is refracted through the institutions of EU economic governance, we would question the degree of efficacy, coherence, and internal consistency of 'European integration' of corporate governance posited in their account. It is erroneous to talk of a 'European' corporate governance reform agenda, either in relation to takeovers, or more broadly.
A wide range of views, rooted in different models of political economy, generate ongoing normative conflict about appropriate corporate governance reform. As Wincott points out, much Europeanisation literature is 'too ready to identify the EUontological -level as ordered, coherent, and consistent, providing a clear basis from which to develop claims about "Europeanisation" ' (2003: 300) . Any assumption of coherence and shared understandings underpinning 'the EU level' in relation to takeover reform is misplaced.
The EC is one key player, but policy elites from many member states also play important roles. Amongst this multiplicity of actors, there is no accepted, agreed 'European' approach to corporate governance reform. Rather, diverse elements endure within the process of European integration, generating ongoing political struggles between, at root, contending models of political economy. Thus the corporate governance regime within the European Union is 'always still in formation, built through political contests and struggles' (Wincott 2003: 300) . The differential outcome of this 'clash of capitalisms' (Callaghan and Hoepner 2005) in different areas of corporate governance is all part of the variable geometry of Europeanisation.
The Sisyphean Task of European Corporate Governance Harmonisation
The scale of EC corporate law interventionism is impressive, with nearly 50 directives or regulations since 1968. Its impact is much more debatable, with the desired harmonisation of European corporate governance proving elusive. Much EC legislative effort has struggled to make its relevance felt within national corporate governance regimes. As Lannoo and Khachaturyan argue, 'the more [the EC] tried to harmonise 'corporate governance'', 'the less successful they were ' (2003: 5) . The 'triviality thesis' highlights 'under-enforcement', 'sporadic enforcement', 'sporadic' judicial interpretation by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and 'parochial interpretation', such that 'one can doubt whether anything really worth calling EC corporate law exists "off the books"', not least because 'the Commission has traditionally lacked the resources to monitor Member States' compliance with corporate law directives' (Enriques 2006: 12; Enriques and Gatti 2006: 5) .
Enriques argues that 'most EC rules can be categorized as optional, marketmimicking, unimportant, or avoidable ' (2006: 1-2, 6-11) . European company law 'tends to be implemented and construed differently in each Member State, according to local legal culture and consistently with prior corporate law provisions' (Enriques 2006: 1-2) . These 'nationalistic tendencies in the interpretation of EC corporate law' mean that 'the prevailing interpretation of any given directive in each jurisdiction is, wherever possible, an interpretation compatible with the existing legal culture' (Enriques 2006: 17-9 ). Halbhuber concurs, identifying how national ideational and institutional structures 'filter European legal materials', rendering it unlikely that EC corporate law 'means the same for lawyers in different Member States ' (2001: 1385) .
There are some qualifications to the thesis (Enriques 2006: 44-45 Discerning the degree to which corporate governance reform is 'European' in origin is a useful analytical exercise, but it has to contend with a co-existence of national and European processes of company law and takeover reform. The waters are further muddied by 'hindsight bias', where EC corporate law regulation merely restates already existing regulation at national level (Cheffins 1997; Enriques 2006: 20-23 Relations between these national regimes are crucial to the 2004 EU-level attempt at takeover regulation harmonisation, since the EC model of a 'level playing field' for transnational corporate activity (in this case takeover deals) rests on an elusive concept of 'reciprocity' (see below), which only makes sense at the inter-national level.
In this instance, these analytical problems do not present insurmountable obstacles.
The EC (notably the internal market directorate general) has a well established takeover regulation agenda, as laid out in its draft proposals for 2001 and 2004 Takeover Directives. This 'European' takeover agenda, modelled on the UK City Code, is rooted in 'one share, one vote' and, more broadly, shareholder value corporate governance norms. The analysis below thus assesses the degree to which these LME shareholder value-oriented preferences prevail in the attempted harmonisation of European takeover regulation.
EC Corporate Governance Harmonisation and the Market for Corporate
Control EC enthusiasm for liberalising takeover regulatory reform dovetails with commitments to establish a fully integrated European capital market. The EC's desired harmonization of European takeover regulation seeks to ensure an unimpeded market or corporate control in Europe, based on an assumption (for which there is at best equivocal support, see e.g. Clarke 2006: 361; Jackson & Miyajima 2007: 19-21) that takeovers enhance efficiency. The EC thus takes an explicit LME position within the European clash of capitalisms, aligned with the 'Anglo-Saxon' OECD good corporate governance agenda (EC 2003: 12-14) . In 2007, the Commission accentuated the positive aspects of takeovers as 'efficient drivers of value creation' which 'facilitate corporate restructuring'. The recognition that takeovers 'are not always beneficial for all (or any) of the parties involved' was relegated to a footnote (2007: 3). Assuming that takeovers deliver efficient restructuring, the EC's liberal aim has been to dismantle the defences described above that insiders use to derail takeovers.
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The 2001 draft directive was viewed in some quarters as embodying an excessively 'Anglo-Saxon' view of takeovers as a necessary discipline against inefficient management which ignored valued 'stakeholder' and CME-oriented European corporate governance traditions. Thus, conflicting models of capitalism (LME versus CME) were the root cause of the Takeover Directives' troubled passage. Pre-bid defences, such as multiple and double voting shares, and concentrated ownership were recurrent sources of disagreement between EC and member states, as well as between member states themselves. The reason was the different conception of the firm financing/corporate governance nexus which these mechanisms and institutions embodied. For the same reason, the liberal principle of board passivity, and UK City Code-style limitations the directive sought to place on defensive measures by target boards subject to hostile takeover attempts (Article 9), generated resistance.
Outlawing these (or allowing them only with shareholder approval) went against the grain of the 'protected capitalism' logic of some European CMEs. There were also concerns about insufficient protection of workers in target firms.
Furthermore, Germany felt particularly vulnerable having engaged in reforms facilitating the development of a market for corporate control (abolishing multiple voting shares) in the 1998 KontraG Law (see Cioffi 2002) . Given that the directive did not force all others to follow suit in abolishing multiple voting shares, and also did not other defences such as Golden Shares, Germany felt that the 2001 Takeover Directive failed to deliver a level playing field (Knudsen 2005: 510- The Commission convened a 'high level' working group of corporate governance and European company law experts, headed by Jaap Winter, to chart progress towards 'good' corporate governance within the EU. More specifically, they were charged with developing measures to achieve the new priority of the 'level playing field' (one of the issues which torpedoed the 2001 Directive), and drafting new Takeover Directive proposals. The Winter group's report assumed takeovers to be efficiency enhancing, and emphasised shareholder decision making, and their new concept of proportionality between risk-bearing capital and control. The working group's recommendations adhered to 'one share, one vote' norms as an integral element of good corporate governance, and recommended abolishing multiple voting rights (Knudsen 2005: 519) . The group thus took an ideological position on one side of the 'clash of capitalisms' divide described above. The LME shareholder value-oriented approach was later characterised by Bolkestein as promoting 'best corporate governance practice' (Bolkestein 2004: 3) .
The new recommendations were, in fact, more radical than the earlier defeated measures, arguing strongly for their particular conception of a 'level playing field'.
The idea was to ensure equivalent safeguards for shareholders in all European public listed companies. Furthermore, arbitrary differences in governance structures across the EU should not distort the corporate restructuring process (Clarke 2006: 355-6 ).
Yet the proposed solution did not remove the problem of asymmetric vulnerability of particular firms or member states. Rather, some argued, the new proposals 'would hit dominant shareholders and incumbent managers around the EU unevenly, prohibiting some structural defences while leaving others untouched' (Enriques 2006: 63) . The Group's recommendations fed into another proposal presented by the Commission in October 2002. This new Directive's guiding principals were that shareholders get equal treatment, are given sufficient information and time to reach an informed decision, and that the target board acts in the interests of the company. The 16 dissemination of information to employees of the target firm was also required.
Mandatory bid provisions were included, with thresholds defined at the national level.
The new proposals still contained the controversially LME-oriented Article 9 ensuring board passivity (preventing post-bid frustrating actions). Seeking to overcome pre-bid defensive institutional engineering designed to impede hostile takeover, the revised (Ipekel 2005: 342-3) because it went to the heart of the differing LME and CME conceptions of corporate governance.
The global level playing field issue remained contentious, with French and German negotiators pointing out that US boards retained a range of defensive measures including 'poison pills' (Monks & Minow 2004: 236) . The proposed Takeover Directive, in depriving European firms of defence mechanisms, would not only undermine the coherence of co-ordinated capitalism, but also skew the playing field against European firms. Again Germany argued that because one share one vote and a lack of takeover defences was not the norm everywhere, the 'playing field' would be The Winter report assumed that both Articles 9 and 11 would be required in tandem to create a level playing field, and either on its own would not deliver that objective. The optional nature of these elements in the final Directive means that the 'level playing field' remains unattained. Reciprocity potentially addresses the lack of a level playing field between European and American firms. However, the Directive is unclear whether reciprocity applies in relation to non-EU bidders (Menucq 2006 However, this new liberal environment was reconciled to French 'protected capitalism' norms through a range of enduring impediments to takeovers, which greatly reduced its significance and impact (see below). Paradoxically, the privatisation process expanded these. Finance minister Balladur's hand-picking of the benefactors of privatisation between 1986 and 1988 deliberately reinforced the noyaux durs (hard cores of investors) within France's 'financial network economy' (Schmidt 1996: 369-392) . Thus, despite the liberalised takeover regime, the French state retained the orchestrating mechanisms to protect French firms through crossshareholding, and interlocking board directorships.
Whilst the overall legal regime is broadly conducive to takeover activity, a recurrent theme of re-regulatory activity in France has been the desire to carve out scope for dirigiste interventionism in 'strategic' sectors. In the 1980s and 1990s, 'Golden shares' in privatised firms were one means to this end, though these have become of French capitalism (Philippon 2007: 14, 51-70) , and another variant of concentrated ownership.
Concentrated ownership operates through a range of the 'pre-bid' defensive measures described above, contained within company statutes. These bolster the position of the incumbent management or dominant shareholders, and make hostile takeover more difficult (Enriques & Volpin 2007: 117) . Mechanisms include differential voting rights, clauses limiting the right to designate board members, shareholder agreements, voting ceilings and restrictions enable controlling shareholder exercising control without necessarily owning a large proportion of the cash flow rights. All of these protect 'insiders', and align with 'stakeholder' and CME approaches to the firm financing /corporate governance nexus.
French double voting shares are another key element in protecting 'insiders'. The double voting right is a reward for loyalty, awarded to all without discrimination who have held shares for over two years. As well as double votes, and a range of voting ceilings limit the voting rights of certain investors, there is also a prevalence of shareholder pacts, notably those restricting transfer of securities. All these allow management to 'create a friendly shareholder group' with the effect of 'seriously obstructing a change of control' (Fanto 1998: 74) . Both unequal voting rights and voting ceilings are much more prevalent in France than in any other major economy.
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Furthermore, these practices are increasingly prevalent, incrementally replacing the noyaux durs as instruments to dissuade takeovers (Magnier 2002: 73-4; Goyer 2003:197 & Table 6 .5). In theory, the bottom line is that all of the dissuasive measures are public knowledge, and therefore get factored into the price offered by the bidder, or bidders. However, the collective impact of these mechanisms is to insert a good deal of 'viscosity' into the system. France permits such 'flexible financing and control' structures, but requires transparency surrounding them (Novelli 2005: 12-3) . These kinds of 'contractual agreements' are often defended as enabling founders of medium sized companies to retrain control of the company when listing (Menucq 2006: 231 There was, however, one area where the French government did draw inspiration from U.S. takeover regulation. At first glance this might appear grist to the mill of those asserting an Anglo-Saxon convergence within French capitalism. Yet, the American market for corporate control is nothing like the free and open play of bids disciplining management to prioritise shareholder value that the LME ideal-type describes. Rather, U.S. corporate governance law has a very well-developed antitakeover arsenal (Monks & Minow 2004: 42, 110-120, 232-239) . In this case, the 
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The new French legislation included the possibility for target boards, with shareholder approval, to issue new securities (in both the pre-and post-bid period) at discounted price to existing shareholders. These 'bons de souscription' (also known as 'bons Breton', named after the initiator of the law) are modelled on American 'poison pills'. This is the first time anything of the sort has existed in French law. Under reciprocity, if the bidder does not apply article 9, these and other defensive measures can be issued or pursued by the board at its discretion provided that authorisation has been gained from a shareholder AGM within the previous 18 months. Their effect is to dilute the effect of any holdings the acquirer already has in the firm, and to raise (perhaps dramatically) the price of the bid. By making control considerably harder to achieve, and raising the price, the aim is not so much to warn off the bidder as to raise the price of the offer and to facilitate negotiation on terms more favourable to the target firm. Its likely effect, recognised by Breton, was to increase the price, rather than to make the bid fail outright (Marini 2006: 11-12) . 
Conclusion
The clash of European capitalisms has been fought on the terrain of takeover regulation. As a result, far from delivering LME-oriented harmonisation (dismantling impediments to the market for corporate control), transposing the Takeover Directive in fact introduced new forms of protection (EC 2007: 6, 10-11) . The battleground for
European takeovers remained every bit as uneven a surface as it had been prior to the Directive. The EC's 'level playing field' remains illusory. Furthermore, given the permitted national derogations, the crucial opt-outs (Articles 9 and 11), and the reciprocity rule, the terrain will become more undulating and nationally variegated (with heightened ambiguity and opacity). This finding necessitates a counter-intuitive rejoinder to the 'triviality thesis'. The EC as a corporate governance actor has had a demonstrable impact, its initiative presenting opportunities to policy actors in their import and mediation by national law and politics. The EC has not, however, induced liberal harmonisation of European takeover regimes.
Recent re-regulation within French corporate governance has not uniformly emulated shareholder value norms. French policy elites, in transposing the Takeover Directive, used the opportunity to rebalance LME and CME elements within the diversity of French capitalist institutions to increase their interventionist scope to protect French firms. Paradoxically, the most significant shift away from freer takeover market was introduced as a direct result of transposing the LME-oriented EU Takeover Directive.
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The The clash of capitalisms, overlain with the 'asymmetric vulnerability' (Knudsen 2005: 524) of firms, and national corporate governance regimes, to EU-level regulatory change, generates resistance to the EU liberalising takeover reform agenda at the national and firm level. This constitutes a major obstacle facing supra-national reform of corporate governance, given the ability of national level actors to reshape and amend takeover reforms, both during their passage through the European Parliament and in the transposition into domestic law (EC 2007: 10-11) . Both countries and firms can opt in and out, increasing the heterogeneity within national varieties of capitalism.
This increased differentiation creates a feedback effect which will increase problems of asymmetric vulnerability.
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Future attempts at the EU-level reform corporate governance will continue to be hamstrung by this (increasing) variety and complexity of institutional and legal environments of corporate governance in Europe, as well as the multitude of defensive measures at European firms' disposal. As the Takeover Directive demonstrated, EC exhortation to endorse supra-national corporate governance harmonisation is insufficient to overcome entrenched corporate and political opposition. This is in part because the assumed superiority of the EC model of political economy, rooted in LME institutions such as shareholder value, and one share one vote, is not accepted. Underlying this lack of consensus is an ongoing contestation surrounding European models of capitalism and their relative merits.
This clash of capitalisms explains why the Takeover Directive was emasculated through optionality, and why the EC failed in its bid to develop an EU Takeover Directive with teeth.
